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Abstract
Facial recognition technologies have become popular and implemented in many areas, including but
not limited to, citizen surveillance, crime control, activity monitoring, and facial expression evaluation.
However, processing biometric information is a resource-intensive task that often involves third-party
servers, which can be accessed by adversaries with malicious intent. Biometric information delivered
to untrusted third-party servers in an uncontrolled manner can be considered a significant privacy
leak (i.e. uncontrolled information release) as biometrics can be correlated with sensitive data such as
healthcare or financial records. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving technique for “controlled
information release”, where we disguise an original face image and prevent leakage of the biometric
features while identifying a person. We introduce a new privacy-preserving face recognition protocol
named PEEP (Privacy using EigEnface Perturbation) that utilizes local differential privacy. PEEP
applies perturbation to Eigenfaces utilizing differential privacy and stores only the perturbed data in
the third-party servers to run a standard Eigenface recognition algorithm. As a result, the trained
model will not be vulnerable to privacy attacks such as membership inference and model memorization
attacks. Our experiments show that PEEP exhibits an accuracy of around 70% - 90% under standard
privacy settings.
Keywords: Privacy preserving face recognition, differential privacy, face recognition, privacy in
artificial intelligence, privacy preserving machine learning
1. Introduction
Face recognition has many applications in the fields of image processing and computer vision;
advancements in related technologies allow its efficient and accurate integration in many areas from
individual face recognition for unlocking a mobile device to crowd surveillance. Offender tracking,
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surveillance, and activity detection are some of the examples where facial recognition systems are
heavily used. Companies have also invested heavily in this field; Google’s facial recognition in the
Google Glass project [1], Facebook’s DeepFace technology [2], and Apple’s patented face identification
system [3] are examples of the growing number of facial identification systems. However, existing face
recognition technologies and the widespread use of biometrics introduce a massive threat to individuals’
privacy, exacerbated by the fact that biometric identification is often done quietly, without telling it
to the observed people.
Information privacy can be defined in different ways, but the main purpose of any definition is to
show two basic aspects: information that has to be hidden and information that needs to be revealed [4].
Accordingly, we can define information privacy as “controlled information release” that permits an
anticipated level of utility via a private function that protects the identity of the data owners [5]. In
privacy-preserving face recognition, we need to identify someone from an image without revealing the
essential biometric features of the image owner, hence, involve at least two main parties: one needs to
recognize an image (party 1), and the other holds the database of images (party 2). Data encryption
would allow party 1 to learn the result without learning the execution of the recognition algorithm
or its parameters, whereas party 2 would not learn the input image or the result of the recognition
process [6]. However, the high computational complexity and the need to trust the parties for their
respective responsibilities can be major issues. Proposed in this paper is data perturbation, which
is significantly less computationally complex, but incurs a certain level of utility loss. Perturbation
allows “controlled information release” and all parties be untrusted [7]. The parties will learn only the
classification result (e.g. name/tag of the image) with a certain level of confidence, but will not have
access to the original image.
This paper looks at privacy leaks from face recognition systems that use untrusted servers, such
as in the cloud, to run the face recognition algorithm. We consider the scenario where a face image
is acquired and sent to an untrusted server for processing, such as in criminal investigations [8]. The
literature identifies two major application scenarios of recognition technologies in which a third party
server is used for face recognition. They are (1) the use of biometric data such as face images and
fingerprint to identify and authenticate a person e.g. at border crossings, and (2) deploy surveillance
cameras in public places to automatically match or identify faces (e.g. the UK uses an estimated 4.2
million surveillance cameras to monitor public areas) [6]. These techniques do not require any explicit
consent from the persons being watched. Facial images directly reflect the owners’ identity, and they
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can be easily linked to other sensitive information such as health records and financial records. This
can pose a serious threat to a person’s privacy.
There are a few methods that are based on encryption to provide privacy-preserving face recog-
nition [6, 9, 10], which need one or more trusted third parties in a server-based setting (e.g. cloud
servers). However, in an environment where no trusted party is present, such semi-honest approaches
raise the question of utility, as the authorized trusted parties are still allowed to access the original
image data (raw or encrypted). Moreover, an encryption based mechanism for scenarios that process
millions of faces would be extremely inefficient and difficult to maintain. The methods such as k−same
[11] for preserving privacy by de-identifying face images can avoid the necessity of a trusted third-party.
However, such methods introduce utility issues in large scale scenarios with millions of faces, due to
the limitations of the underlying privacy models used (e.g. k− anonymity) [7]. We identify five main
types of issues (TYIS) with the existing privacy-preserving approaches for face recognition. They are
as follows. TYIS 1: face biometrics should not be linkable to other sensitive data, TYIS 2: the method
should be scalable and resource friendly, TYIS 3: face biometrics should not be accessible by anyone
(i.e. use one-way transformation), TYIS 4: face biometrics of the same person from two different
applications should not be linkable, and TYIS 5: face biometrics should be revocable (if data is leaked,
the application should have a way of revoking them to prevent any malicious use).
This paper proposes a method to control privacy leakage from face recognition, answering the
five TYIS better than the existing privacy-preserving face recognition approaches. We propose an
approach that stores data in a perturbed form. The method utilizes differential privacy to devise
a novel technique (named PEEP: Privacy using EigEnface Perturbation) for privacy-preserving face
recognition. PEEP uses the properties of local differential privacy to apply perturbation on input
image data to limit potential privacy leaks due to the involvement of untrusted third-party servers
and users. To avoid the necessity of a trusted third party, we apply randomization to the data used
for training and testing. Due to the extremely low complexity, PEEP can be easily implemented on
resource-constrained devices, allowing the possibility of perturbation at the input end. The ability to
control the level of privacy via adjusting the privacy budget is an additional advantage of the proposed
method. The privacy budget is used to signify the level of privacy provided by a privacy-preserving
algorithm; the higher the privacy budget, the lower the privacy. PEEP utilizes local differential privacy
at the cost of as low as 6 points drop in accuracy, e.g. 85% to 79% with a privacy budget of ε = 8
where 0 < ε ≤ 9 is considered as an acceptable level of privacy [12, 13]. Moreover, PEEP is capable of
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adjusting the privacy-accuracy trade-off by changing the privacy budget through added noise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The foundations of the proposed work are briefly
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 provides the technical details of the proposed approach. The results
are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 provides a summary of existing related work. The paper is
concluded in Section 6.
2. Foundations
In this section, we describe the background of the techniques used in the proposed solution. PEEP
conducts privacy preserving face recognition utilizing the concepts of differential privacy and eigenface
recognition.
2.1. Differential Privacy (DP)
DP is a privacy model that is known to render maximum privacy by minimizing the chance of
individual record identification [14]. In principle, DP defines the bounds to how much information can
be revealed to a third party/adversary about someone’s data being present in a particular database.
Conventionally ε (epsilon) is used to denote the level of privacy rendered by a randomized privacy-
preserving algorithm (M) over a particular database (D); ε is called the privacy budget that provides
an insight into the privacy loss of a DP algorithm. The higher the value of ε, the higher the privacy
loss.
Let’s take two adjacent datasets of D, x and y, where y differs from x only by (plus or minus) one
person. ThenM satisfies (ε)-DP if Equation (1) holds. Assume, datasets x and y as being collections
of records from a universe X and N denotes the set of all non-negative integers including zero.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M with domain N |X | and range R: is ε-differentially private
if for every adjacent x, y ∈ N |X | and for any subset S ⊆ R
Pr[(M(x) ∈ S)] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[(M(y) ∈ S)] (1)
2.2. Global vs. Local Differential Privacy
Global differential privacy (GDP) and local differential privacy (LDP) are the two main approaches
to DP. In the GDP setting, there is a trusted curator who applies carefully calibrated random noise
to the real values returned for a particular query. The GDP setting is also called the trusted curator
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model [15]. Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism [16] are two of the most frequently used noise
generation methods in GDP [16]. A randomized algorithm, M provides ε-GDP if Equation (1) holds.
LDP randomizes data before the curator can access them, without the need of a trusted curator. LDP
is also called the untrusted curator model [14]. LDP can also be used by a trusted party to randomize
all records in a database at once. LDP algorithms may often produce too noisy data, as noise is applied
to achieve individual record privacy. LDP is considered to be a strong and rigorous notion of privacy
that provides plausible deniability and deemed to be a state-of-the-art approach for privacy-preserving
data collection and distribution. A randomized algorithm A provides ε-LDP if Equation (2) holds
[17].
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A satisfies ε-LDP if for all pairs of users’ inputs v1 and v2
and for all Q ⊆ Range(A), and for (ε ≥ 0) Equation (2) holds. Range(A) is the set of all possible
outputs of the randomized algorithm A.
Pr[A(v1) ∈ Q] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[A(v2) ∈ Q] (2)
2.3. Sensitivity
Sensitivity is defined as the maximum influence that a single individual can have on the result of a
numeric query. Consider a function f , the sensitivity (∆f) of f can be given as in Equation (3) where
x and y are two neighboring databases (or in LDP, adjacent records) and ‖.‖1 represents the L1 norm
of a vector [18].
∆f = max{‖f(x)− f(y)‖1} (3)
2.4. Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism is considered to be one of the most generic approaches to achieve DP [16].
Laplace noise can be added to a function output (F(D)) as given in Equation 5 to produce a differ-
entially private output. ∆f denotes the sensitivity of the function f . In local differentially private
setting, the scale of the Laplacian noise is equal to ∆f/ε, and the position is the current input value
(F(D)).
PF(D) = F(D) + Lap(∆f
ε
) (4)
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PF(D) = ε
2∆f
e−
|x−F(D)|ε
∆f (5)
2.5. Eigenfaces and Eigenface recognition
The process of face recognition involves data classification where input data are images, and output
classes are persons’ names. A face recognition algorithm needs to be first trained with an existing
database of faces. The trained model will then be used to recognize a person’s name using an image
input. The training algorithm needs various images to have high accuracy. When the model needs to
be trained to recognize a large number of persons, the training algorithm also needs a large number of
training images. Image data are often large, and the higher the number of faces to be trained, the slower
the algorithm. However, facial recognition systems need high efficiency, as many of them are employed
in real-time systems such as citizen surveillance [19]. When an artificial neural network (ANN) is
used for face recognition, the input images need to be flattened into 1-d vectors. An image with the
dimensions m × n will result in an mn × 1 vector. High-resolution images will result in extremely
long 1-d vectors, which leads to slow training and testing of the corresponding ANN. Dimensionality
reduction methods can be used to avoid such complexities, and allow face recognition to concentrate
on the essential features, and to ignore the noise in the input images. In dimensionality reduction,
the points are projected onto a higher-dimensional line, which is named as a hyperplane. Principal
component analysis (PCA) is a dimensionality reduction technique that represents a hyperplane with
maximum variance. This hyperplane can be determined using eigenvectors, which can be computed
using the covariance matrix of input data [19].
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Algorithm 1: Generating Eigenfaces
Input:
{xc1, . . . , xcn} ← normalized and centered examples
nc ← expected number of PCA components
Output: EIMAT ← matrix of eigenfaces
1 for each xci do
2 flatten xci to produce vector ti
3 compute the mean face vector (Fm), Fm = 1nΣni=1ti;
4 for each xci do
5 si = ti −Fm;
6 generate covariance matrix, C,
C = 1nΣni=1si × sTi = AAT , where, A = [s1s2 . . . sn];
7 calculate the eigenvectors ei of AAT
since, AAT can be extensive, derive ei from the eigenvectors ui of ATA, where, ei = Aui;
8 compute the n best eigenvectors ei such that, ‖ei‖ = 1;
9 return nc eigenvectors which corresponds to the nc largest eigenvalues
Algorithm 1 shows the steps for generating Eigenfaces. As shown in the algorithm, an eigenface [20]
utilizes PCA to represent a dimensionality-reduced version of an input image. A particular eigenface
considers a predefined number of the largest eigenvectors as the principal axes that we project our
data on to, hence producing reduced dimensions [19]. We can reduce the dimensions of an m×n image
into a k dimensional eigenface where k is the largest k eigenvectors. By doing this, we can consider
only the most essential characteristics of an input image and increase the speed of a facial recognition
algorithm while preserving high accuracy. Equation 6 provides the mathematical representation of an
eigenface where F is a new face, Fm is the mean or the average face, Fi is an EigenFace, and αi are
scalar multipliers which we have to choose in order to create new faces.
F = Fm +
n∑
i=1
αiFi (6)
3. Our Approach: PEEP
In this section, we discuss the steps employed in the proposed privacy-preserving face recognition
approach (named as PEEP). We utilize DP to apply confidentiality to face recognition. PEEP applies
randomization upon the eigenfaces to create privacy-preserving versions of input images. We assume
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that any input device which is used to capture the facial images use PEEP to apply randomization
before sending the images to the storage devices/servers.
Untrusted Server
Original Face
Eigenface
Perturbed Eigenface
Untrusted Server
Randomize
PEEP
Lo
ca
l E
dg
e
Privacy Preserving
Face Recognition
Model (e.g. ANN)
Training
PEEP
Untrusted UserUntrusted User
Testing
PEEP
Face 2 Face 3 Face 4
Face i Face j
LOCAL
EDGE A
LOCAL
EDGE B
Figure 1: Privacy-preserving face recognition using PEEP. The figure shows the placement of PEEP in a face recognition
system. As shown, PEEP randomizes both training and testing images so that the untrusted third-party servers do not
leak any private data to untrusted users. The callout figure in the left-hand side shows the basic flow of randomization
inside PEEP, which applies Laplacian noise over eigenfaces.
As depicted by the callout box in Figure 1, PEEP involves three primary steps to enforce privacy
on face recognition. They are, 1. accepting original face images, 2. generating eigenfaces, and 3.
adding Laplacian noise to randomize the images. In the proposed setting, the face recognition model
(e.g. MLPClassifier) will be trained solely using randomized data. An untrusted server will hold only
a privacy-preserving version of the face recognition model.
3.1. Distributed eigenface generation
When the number of input faces increases to a large number, it is important that the eigenface
calculation (generation) can be distributed in order to maintain efficiency. Algorithm 2 shows an incre-
mental calculation approach of eigenfaces where a central computer (CC) in the local edge contributes
to the calculation of eigenfaces in a distributed fashion. As shown in step 5 in Algorithm 2, the mean
face vectors, F im that are generated for each partition of input data are collected and merged (using
Equation 7) by the CC to generate the global mean face vector Fglobm . Similarly, the CC generates the
global covariance matrix, Cglob (refer step 10 Algorithm 2) using the covariance matrices generated for
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each partition using Equation 10. In this way, PEEP manages to maintain the efficiency of eigenface
generation for extensive datasets.
Fglobm =

m1×y11+m2×y12+...+mk×y1k
m1+m2+...+mk
m1×y21+m2×y22+...+mk×y2k
m1+m2+...+mk
...
m1×yn1+m2×yn2+...+mk×ynk
m1+m2+...+mk

n×1
(7)
In Equation 7, mi refers to the number of eigenfaces in the i
th partition, whereas yij refers to the
mean of the jth index of the ith partition. To merge the covariance matrices, the pairwise covariance
update formula introduced in [21] is adapted as shown in Equation 10 [22]. The pairwise covariance
update formula for the two merged two column (u and v) data partitions, A and B, can be written as
shown in Equation 8 where the merged dataset is denoted as X.
Cov(X) =
CA
(mA−1) +
CB
(mB−1) + (µu,A − µu,B)(µv,A − µv,B).mA.mBmX
(mX − 1) (8)
Where, µu,A, µu,A, µv,A, µv,B are means of u and v of the two data partitions A and B, respectively.
CA and CB are the co-moments of the two data partitions A and B where the co-moment of a two
column (u and v) dataset D is represented as,
CD =
∑
(u,v)∈D
(u− µu)(v − µv) (9)
Therefore, the variance-covariance matrix update formula of the two data partitions Dg and Di
can be written as shown in Equation 10,
Cglob =
Cglob
(mDg−1) +
Ci
(mDi−1) + (µDg (MIg)− µDi(MIg))(µDg (MIi)− µDi(MIi)).
mDg .mDi
mDnew
(mDnew − 1)
(10)
In Equation 10, assume that Cglob and Ci are the covariance matrices returned for the data partitions
Dg and Di respectively, where Dg represents the global partition (concatenation of all the former
partition), whereas Di represents the new partition introduced to the calculation. Dnew is the merged
dataset of the the data partitions, Dg and Di. µDg and µDi are mean vectors of Dg and Di
respectively. mD represents the number of eigenfaces in the corresponding dataset. Equation 10 will
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be iteratively calculated for all the data partitions to generate the final value of Dg. Cglob is initialized
with the first partition, and Di will start from the second partition and,
MIi =

[1]n
[2]n
[3]n
...
[n]n

n×n
(11)
We can also run Algorithm 2 in distributed computing nodes (DCN) within the local edge to conduct
efficient eigenface generation. In such a setting, DCNs will communicate with a central computer (in
the local edge) to generate the global mean face (Fglobm ) and the global covariance matrix (Cglob). In
this way, an agency can deal with a large number of input faces by maintaining a feasible number of
DCNs.
Algorithm 2: Incremental calculation of Eigenfaces using data partitions
Input:
{xpk1 , . . . , xpkn } ← normalized and centered example partition, pk
nc ← expected number of PCA components
Output: EIMAT ← matrix of eigenfaces
1 for each xpki do
2 flatten xpki to produce vector ti
3 compute the mean face vector (F im), F im = 1nΣni=1ti;
4 collect F im at a central computer (CC) in the local edge ;
5 receive global mean face vector, Fglobm from the CC;
6 for each xci do
7 si = ti −Fglobm ;
8 generate covariance matrix, Ci,
Ci = 1nΣni=1si × sTi = AiATi , where, Ai = [s1s2 . . . sn];
9 collect Ci at the CC;
10 receive global covariance matrix, Cglob from the CC;
11 calculate the eigenvectors ei of AAT , where Cglob = AAT
since, AAT can be extensive, derive ei from the eigenvectors ui of ATA, where, ei = Aui;
12 compute the n best eigenvectors ei such that, ‖ei‖ = 1;
13 return nc eigenvectors which corresponds to the nc largest eigenvalues
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3.2. Generation of the principal components
After accepting the image inputs, PEEP normalizes the images to match a predefined resolution
(which is accepted by PEEP as an input). We consider a default resolution normalization of 47× 62.
However, based on the input image sizes and the computational power of the edge devices, the users
can increase or decrease the values of irw and irh suitably. Following the steps of Algorithm 1, PEEP
calculates the principal components by considering the eigenvectors using the corresponding covariance
matrix. The largest nc (the number of principal components) number of eigenvectors are used to create
a particular eigenface (nc is taken as input). The higher the nc, the higher the representation of input
features, the lower the efficiency. It is important to select a suitable number for nc that can provide
both high accuracy and high efficiency at the same time. A reliable number for nc can be determined
by investigating the change of accuracy of the trained model.
3.3. Declaring the sensitivity before noise addition
PEEP scales the indices of the identified PCA vectors within the interval [0,1] as the next step after
generating the eigenfaces. In LDP, the sensitivity is the maximum difference between two adjacent
records. In PEEP, the inputs are images, and each image is dimensionality reduced to form a vector
by using PCA (PCA vectors). As PEEP adds noise to these vectors (PCA vectors), the sensitivity of
PEEP is the maximum difference between two such PCA vectors which can be denoted by Equation 12,
where FSVj represents a flattened image vector scaled within the interval [0,1], FSVj+1 is adjacent
to FSVj . Since PEEP examines the Cartesian system, we can consider the maximum Euclidean
distance for the sensitivity, which is equal to a maximum of
√
nc where nc is the number of principal
components. As the normalized PCA vectors are bounded by 0 and 1, a sensitivity much greater than
1 would entail a substantial level of noise, which can reduce the utility drastically as we use LDP for
the noise application mechanism. Therefore, we select the sensitivity to be the maximum difference
between two indices, which is equal to 1. Now the scale of the Laplacian noise will be equal to 1/ε.
As future work, we are conducting a further algebraic analysis of sensitivity to improve the precision
and flexibility of the Laplace mechanism in the proposed approach of face recognition. After defining
the position and scale parameters, PEEP adds Laplacian noise to each index of PCA vectors. We take
the position of the noise to be the index values and the scale of the noise to be 1/ε. To generate the
private versions of images (PI), we can perturb each index according to Equation 13, where FSVi
represents an index of the flattened image vectors scaled within the interval [0,1].
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∆f = max{‖FSVj −FSV(j+1)‖1} (12)
3.4. Introducing Laplacian noise
After defining the position and scale parameters, PEEP adds Laplacian noise to each index of
PCA vectors. We take the position of the noise to be the index values and the scale of the noise to be
1/ε. To generate the private versions of images (PI), we perturb each index according to Equation
13, where FSVi represents an index of the flattened image vectors scaled between 0 and 1. The user
can provide a suitable ε value depending on the amount of privacy required and after considering the
following guidelines. The higher the ε value, the lower the privacy. As a norm, 0 < ε ≤ 9 is considered
as an acceptable level of privacy [12]. We recommend to follow the same standard and use an upper
limit of 9 for ε.
PI = ε
2∆f
e−
|x−FSVi|ε
∆f (13)
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Algorithm 3: Differentially private facial recognition: PEEP
Input:
{x1, . . . , xn} ← examples
imthresh ← number of images per face
ε ← privacy budget
irw ← pixel width (default = 47)
irh ← pixel height (default = 62)
nc ← number of PCA components
Output:
DPFRS ← privacy preserving
facial recognition model
1 Find the minimum width of all image (wmin);
2 Fine the minimum height of all image (hmin);
3 if irw < wmin ∨ irh < hmin then
4 irw = wmin
5 irh = hmin
6 normalize the example resolution to irw × irh ;
7 if nc > irw ∨ nc > irh then
8 nc = min(irw, irh)
9 generate the flattened vectors (vi) for each xi;
10 generate the first nc PCA components (PCAi) for each input, vi, according to Algorithm 1;
11 scale all the indices of vi between 0 and 1 to generate svi;
12 apply ε2∆f e
− |x−FSVi|ε∆F to each index of svi with sensitivity (∆f) = 1 ;
13 feed {sv1, . . . , svn} and corresponding targets to the classification model;
14 train the classification model using the randomized data to produce a differentially private classification
model (DPFRS);
15 release the DPFRS;
3.5. Algorithm for generating a differentially private face recognition model
Algorithm 3 shows the steps of PEEP in conducting privacy-preserving face recognition model
training. As shown in the algorithm, irw and irh parameters are used to increase the resolution of
the input images. We use the input parameter, imthresh, to accept the number of images considered
per single face (person). Since the main task of face recognition is image classification, each face
represents a class. In order to produce good accuracy, a classification model should have a good
image representation. Consequently, imthresh is a valuable parameter that directly influences the
accuracy, where a higher value of imthresh will certainly contribute to higher accuracy due to the
better representation of images between the classes (faces). Hence, imthresh allows the algorithm
to extract eigenfaces that provide a better representation of the input images resulting in better
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accuracy. Step 3 makes sure that the number of PCA components selected does not go beyond the
allowed threshold.
3.6. Privacy preserving face recognition using PEEP
As shown in Figure 1, each image input will be subjected to PEEP randomization before training
or testing. The Eigenface generation and randomization take place within the local edge bounds. We
assume that all input devices communicate with the third party servers only through PEEP, and the
face recognition database stores only the perturbed images. Since the face recognition model (e.g.
MLPClassifier) is trained only using perturbed images (perturbed eigenfaces), the trained model will
not leak private information. Any untrusted access to the server will not allow any loss of valuable
biometric data to malicious third parties. Since PEEP perturbs testing data, there is minimal privacy
leak from testing data (testing image inputs) as well.
3.7. Theoretical privacy guarantee of PEEP on trained classifier
Although additional computations are carried out on the outcome of a differentially private algo-
rithm, they do not weaken the privacy guarantee. So, the results of additional computations on ε-DP
outcome will still be ε-DP. This property of DP is called the postprocessing invariance/robustness [23].
Since PEEP utilizes DP, PEEP also inherits postprocessing invariance. The postprocessing invariance
property guarantees that the trained model of perturbed data also satisfies the same privacy imposed
by PEEP. Therefore, the proposed method ensures that there is a minimal level of privacy leak from
the third party untrusted servers. However, we further investigate the privacy strength of PEEP using
empirical evidence under Section 4.
3.8. Datasets
We used the open face image dataset and the large-scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) dataset
(see Figure 2 for sample images) to test the performance of PEEP. Open face image dataset named lfw-
funneled is available at the University of Massachusetts website named “Labeled Faces in the Wild”1.
The lfw-funneled dataset has 13,233 gray images. We limit the minimum number of faces per person to
100, which limits the number of images to 1,140 with five classes; “Colin Powell”, “Donald Rumsfeld”,
“George W Bush”, “Gerhard Schroeder”, and “Tony Blair”2. Figure 2 shows the appearance of 8
1http://vis-www.cs.umass.edu/lfw/
2The diversity of the classes of the dataset are as follows, “Colin Powell”: 236, “Donald Rumsfeld”: 121, “George W
Bush”: 530, “Gerhard Schroeder”: 109, and “Tony Blair”: 144.
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sample images that are available in the datasets used. We used 70% of the input dataset for training
and 30% for testing. CelebA3 dataset has more than 200K celebrity images, each with 40 attribute
annotations. CelebA has 10,177 number of identities, 202,599 number of face images, and 5 landmark
locations, 40 binary attributes annotations per image.
Sample images of "CelebA" dataset
Sample images of "lfw-funneled" dataset
Figure 2: Sample images of the two databases. The lfw-funneled dataset is composed of gray images whereas the CelebA
dataset is composed of colored images.
3.9. Eigenfaces and Eigenface perturbation
Figure 3 shows 8 sample eigenfaces before perturbation. As the figure shows, eigenfaces already
hide some features of the original images due to the dimensionality reduction [24]. However, eigenfaces
alone would not provide enough privacy as they display the most important biometric features, and
there are effective face reconstruction techniques [20, 25] for eigenfaces as demonstrated in Figure 4,
which shows the same set of eigenfaces (available in Figure 3) after noise addition by PEEP with ε = 4.
As the figure shows, the naked eye cannot detect any biometric features from the perturbed eigenfaces.
Even at an extreme case of a privacy budget (ε = 100), the perturbed eigenfaces show mild levels of
facial features to the naked eyes, as shown in Figure 5.
3http://mmlab.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/projects/CelebA.html
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eigenface 0 eigenface 1 eigenface 2 eigenface 3
eigenface 4 eigenface 5 eigenface 6 eigenface 7
eigenface 8 eigenface 9 eigenface 10 eigenface 11
Figure 3: Eigenfaces. The figure shows a collection of sample eigenfaces generated from the input face images. The
eigenfaces show only the most essential features of the input images.
eigenface 0 eigenface 1 eigenface 2 eigenface 3
eigenface 4 eigenface 5 eigenface 6 eigenface 7
eigenface 8 eigenface 9 eigenface 10 eigenface 11
Figure 4: Perturbed eigenfaces at ε = 4. The randomized images appear to show no biometric features to the naked eye
at ε = 4.
eigenface 0 eigenface 1 eigenface 2 eigenface 3
eigenface 4 eigenface 5 eigenface 6 eigenface 7
eigenface 8 eigenface 9 eigenface 10 eigenface 11
Figure 5: Perturbed eigenfaces at ε = 100. Here we try to demonstrate that even at an extreme case of the privacy
budget (which is 100 and is not an acceptable value for ε, since 0 < ε ≤ 9 is considered as the acceptable range for
ε [12]), PEEP is capable of hiding a lot of biometric features from the eigenfaces.
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4. Results and Discussion
In this section, we discuss the experiments, experimental configurations, and their results. We
used MLPClassifier to test the accuracy of face recognition with PEEP. MLPClassifier is a multi-layer
perceptron classifier available in the scikit learn4 Python library. We conducted all the experiments on
a Windows 10 (Home 64-bit, Build 17134) computer with Intel (R) i5-6200U (6th generation) CPU (2
cores with 4 logical threads, 2.3 GHz with turbo up to 2.8 GHz) and 8192 MB RAM. Then we provide
an efficiency comparison and a privacy comparison of PEEP against two other privacy-preserving face
recognition approaches developed by Zekeriya Erkin et al. (we abbreviate it as ZEYN for simplicity) [6]
and Ahman-Reza Sadehi et al. (we abbreviate it as ANRA for simplicity) [9]. Both ZEYN and ANRA
are cryptographic methods that use homomorphic encryption.
4.1. Training the MLPClassifier for perturbed eigenface recognition
We trained the MLPClassifier5 under different levels of ε ranging from 0.5 to 8 as plotted in Figure
7. Due to the heavy noise, the datasets with lower privacy budgets exhibited difficulty for training the
MLPClassifier. However, we didn’t conduct any parameter tuning to increase the performance of the
MLPClassifier in order to make sure that we investigate the absolute impact of perturbation on the
model. Figure 6 shows the model loss of the training process of MLPClassifier when ε = 4. As the
figure shows, the model converges after around 14 epochs.
0 5 10 15 20
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0.00
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0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
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ss
Figure 6: Model loss when PEEP with ε = 4. As shown in the figure, the MLPClassifier converges after around 14
epochs.
4https://scikit-learn.org/stable/index.html
5Settings used for the MLP classifier; activation=‘relu’, batch size=100, early stopping =False, hid-
den layer sizes=(512, 1024, 2014, 1024, 512), max iter =200, shuffle=True, and solver=‘adam’, alpha=0.0001,
beta 1=0.9, beta 2=0.999, epsilon=1e-08, learning rate=‘constant’, learning rate init=0.001, momentum=0.9, nes-
terovs momentum=True, power t=0.5, random state=None, tol=0.0001, validation fraction=0.1, verbose=True,
warm start=False.
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4.2. Classification accuracy vs. privacy budget
We recorded the accuracy of the trained MLPClassifier in the means of the weighted average of
precision, recall, and f1-score against varying levels of privacy budget, and plotted the corresponding
data as shown in Figure 7. As discussed in Section 3.8, the class, “George W Bush” showed a higher
performance as there was a higher proportion of the input image instances related to that class. As
shown in Figure 7, increasing the privacy budget increases accuracy, as higher privacy budgets impose
less amount of randomization on the eigenfaces. We can see that PEEP produces reasonable accuracy
for privacy budgets greater than 4 and less than or equal to 8, where 0 < ε ≤ 9 is considered as an
acceptable level of privacy [12].
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Figure 7: Performance of face recognition with privacy introduced by PEEP. WP refers to the instance of classification
model without privacy where no randomization is applied to the input images.
Figure 8 shows the classification results of 8 random input images in the testing sample at ε = 4.
According to the figure, only in one case out of eight have been misclassified. The parameters such as
the minimum number of faces per each class, the size of the input dataset, and the hyperparameters of
the MLPClassifier have a direct impact on accuracy. We can improve the accuracy of the MLPClassifier
by changing the input parameters and conducting hyperparameter tuning. Moreover, the dataset has
a higher number of instances for the class “George W Bush” compared to the other classes. A more
balanced dataset would also provide better accuracy. However, in this paper, we investigate only the
absolute effect of the privacy parameters on the performance of the MLPClassifier.
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Figure 8: Instance of the face recognition when the images are randomized using PEEP at ε = 4 (the randomized images
at ε = 4 are shown in Figure 4). The figure shows the predicted labels of the images against the original true labels.
4.3. Effect of imthresh on the performance of face recognition
In this section, we test the effect of imthresh (the number of images per single face) on the per-
formance of face recognition (refer Figure 9). During the experiment, we maintained an ε value of 8
and the number of PCA components at 128. As shown in the plots, the performance of classification
improves with imthresh. This is a predicted observation as face recognition is a classification prob-
lem. A higher value of imthresh provides a higher representation for the corresponding face (class),
generating higher accuracy. Hence, the proposed concept prefers a higher value for imthresh. This
feature encourages having the highest value possible for imthresh, in order to generate the highest
accuracy possible.
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Figure 9: Performance of face recognition Vs. imthresh.
4.4. Effect of the number of PCA components on the performance of face recognition
In this section, we investigate the effect of the number of PCA components on the performance of
face recognition. During the experiment, we maintained an ε value of 8, and imthresh was maintained
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at 100. As shown by the plot (refer Figure 10), there is an immediate increment of performance when
the number of PCA components increased from 10 to 20. As the number of PCA components increase,
there is a gradual increase in performance after 20 PCA components. This is due to the first 20 to 40
PCA components representing the most significant features of the input images. Although the effect
of the number of PCA components after 40 is low, the improved performance suggests that it is better
to have a higher number of PCA components to produce better performance.
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Figure 10: Performance of face recognition Vs. the number of PCA components.
4.5. Face reconstruction attack setup
It is essential that the randomized images cannot be used to reconstruct the original images that
reveal the identity of the owners. We prepared an experimental setup to investigate the robustness of
PEEP against face reconstruction [20, 25] applied by adversaries on the randomized images.
PEEP
Face 1
Face n
Testing image
Perturbed eigenface
Face 2
Trained PCA
Model
Regenerated face with privacy
Figure 11: Face reconstruction from perturbed eigenfaces. The figure shows the experimental setup used for the recon-
struction of the original input face images using the perturbed eigenfaces.
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As shown in Figure 11, first, we create a PCAmodel (PCA: Principal Component Analysis) using
2,000 training images (first 1,000 images of the CelebA database and the vertically flipped versions of
them). The resolution of each image is 89× 109. The trained PCAmodel has the 2,000 eigenvectors of
length 29,103 (89 × 109 × 3) and the mean vector (of the 2,000 eigenvectors) of length 29,103. Next,
the testing image (of size 89 × 109×) is read and flattened to form a vectorized form of the original
image. The mean vector is then subtracted from it, and the resulting vector is randomized using PEEP
to generate the privacy-preserving representation of the testing vector (PV). Finally, we generate the
eigenfaces (Fi) and the average face by reshaping the eigenvectors (FVi) and mean vector available in
the PCAmodel. Now we can reconstruct the original testing image from PV using Equation 14 where
n is the number of training images used for the PCAmodel, and RI is the recovered image.
RI =
n∑
i=1
Fi × (PV • FVi) (14)
4.6. Empirical privacy of PEEP
Figure 12 shows the effectiveness of eigenface reconstruction attack (explained in Section 4.5) of a
face image. The figure includes the results of the attack on two testing images. Figure 4 provides the
empirical evidence to the level of privacy rendered by PEEP in which the lower the ε, the higher the
privacy. At ε = 0.5, the attack is not successful in generating any underlying features of an image.
At ε = 4 and above, we can see that the reconstructed images have some features, but they are not
detailed enough to identify the person shown in that image.
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Figure 12: Reconstructing images using the setup depicted in Figure 11. The first row shows original images. The
second row shows the reconstructed images using the eigenfaces of the images of the first row without privacy. The three
remaining rows show the face reconstruction at the privacy levels of ε equals to 8, 4, and 0.5, respectively.
4.7. Performance of PEEP against other approaches
In this section, we discuss the privacy guarantee of PEEP and the comparable methods with regards
to five privacy issues (TYIS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) in face recognition systems, as identified in Section 1. The
first six rows of Table 1 provide the summary of the evaluation, where a tick mark indicates effective
addressing of a particular issue, while a cross mark shows failure. Partially addressed issues are denoted
by a “∂” symbol. PEEP satisfies TYIS 1 and TYIS 4 by randomizing the input images (both training
and testing) so that the randomized images do not provide any linkability to other sensitive data.
Both ZEYN and ANRA are semi-honest mechanisms and need database owners to maintain the facial
image databases. ZEYN and ANRA satisfy TYIS 1, if and only if the database owners are fully trusted,
which can be challenging in a cloud setting, as untrusted third parties with malicious intent can access
the cloud servers. As shown in Section 4.6, the randomized eigenfaces cannot be used to reconstruct
original images. As the PEEP stores only randomized data in the servers, PEEP does not have to
worry about the security of the cloud server. As a result, any leak of data from the cloud server will
not have an adverse effect on user privacy. The scalability results of the three methods given in the
last row of Table 1 show that PEEP satisfies TYIS 2 by providing better scalability than ZEYN and
ANRA. PEEP satisfies TYIS 3 because it uses no trusted party, whereas ZEYN and ANRA must have
trusted database owners. PEEP provides some level of guarantee towards TYIS 5 by randomizing all
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the subsequent face image inputs related to the same person, which can come from the same device or
different devices. Consequently, two input images related to the same person will have two different
levels of randomization, leaving a low probability of linkability.
Table 1: Performance of PEEP against other approaches
Qualitative
comparison
Type of issue
(TYIS)
ZEYN ANRA PEEP
1. biometric should
not be linkable to
other sensitive data
∂ ∂
2. scalable and
resource friendly
× ×
3. biometrics should
not be accessible
by a third-party
× ×
4. biometrics of the
same person from
two applications
should not be
linkable
∂ ∂
5. biometrics should
be revocable
× × ∂
Quantitative
comparison
Average time to
recognize one
image in seconds
when the database
has 798 images
∼ 24 to 43 ∼ 10 0.006
= fully satisfied, ∂ = partially satisfied,× = not satisfied
4.8. Computational complexity
PEEP involves two independent segments (components) in recognizing a particular face image.
Component 1 is the randomization process, and component 2 is the recognition process. The two
components conduct independent operations; hence they need independent evaluations for computa-
tional complexity. Moreover, as PEEP does not need a secure communication channel, the complexity
behind maintaining a secure channel does not have any influence on the performance of PEEP. For
a particular instance of PEEP (refer to Algorithm 3), step 11 to step 12 display linear complexity of
O(nc), where nc is the number of principal components, and the image resolution (width in pixels,
height in pixels) will remain constant during a particular instance of perturbation and recognition.
When width in pixels=47, height in pixels=62, and the number of PCA components=128, PEEP
takes around 0.004 seconds to randomize a single input image. Component 2 can be composed of any
suitable classification model; in our case, we use the MLPClassifier (refer Section 4.1) as the facial
recognition module that was trained using 798 images. Under the same input settings (width in pix-
23
els=47, height in pixels=62, and the number of PCA components=128), the trained model takes 0.002
seconds to recognize a facial image input. Since the prediction is always done on a converged model,
the time taken for prediction will be constant and follow a complexity of O(1). For randomization and
prediction PEEP roughly consumes around 0.006 seconds under the given experimental settings. The
runtime plots shown in Figure 13 further validate the computational complexities evaluated above.
According to the last row of Table 1, PEEP is considerably faster than comparative methods; PEEP
provides a more effective and efficient approach towards the recognition of images against millions of
faces in a privacy-preserving manner.
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Figure 13: The time consumption of PEEP to randomize and recognize one input image against the increasing number
of principal components used for the eigenface generation.
5. Related Work
Literature shows a vast advancement in the area of face recognition that has employed different
approaches, such as input image preprocessing [26], statistical approaches [27, 28], and deep learn-
ing [29]. The continuous improvements in the field have drastically improved the face recognition
accuracy making it a vastly used approach in many fields [29]. Furthermore, the approaches, such
as proposed by Cendrillon et al., show the dynamic capabilities of face recognition approaches that
allow real-time processing [30]. However, biometric data analysis is a vast area not limited to face
recognition. With biometric data, a major threat is privacy violation [31]. Biometric data are almost
always non-revocable and can be used to identify a person in a large set of individuals easily; hence, it
is essential to apply some privacy-preserving mechanism when using biometrics, e.g. for identification
and authentication [32]. Literature shows a few approaches to address privacy issues in face recogni-
tion. Zekeriya Erkin et al. (ZEYN) [6] introduced a privacy-preserving face recognition method based
on a cryptographic protocol for comparing two Pailler-encrypted values. Their solution focuses on a
24
two-party scenario where one party holds the privacy-preserving algorithm and the database of face
images, and the other party wants to recognize/classify a facial image input. ZEYN requires O(log
M) rounds, and it needs computationally expensive operations on homomorphically encrypted data
to recognize a face in a database of images, hence not suitable for large scale scenarios. Ahman-Reza
Sadehi et al. (ANRA) [9] introduced a relatively efficient method based on homomorphic encryption
with garbled circuits. Nevertheless, the complexity of ANRA also has the same problem of failing
to address large scale scenarios. Xiang et al. tried to overcome the computational complexities of
the previous methods by introducing another cryptographic mechanism that uses the cloud [10] for
outsourced computations. However, being a semi-honest model, introducing another untrusted module
such as the cloud increases the possibility of privacy leak. The proposed cryptographic methods cannot
work without a trusted third party, and these trusted parties may later behave maliciously. Newton
et al. proposed a de-identification approach for face images (named as k − same), which does not
need complex cryptographic operations [11]. The proposed method is based on k− anonymity [7, 33].
However, k−anonymity tends to reduce accuracy and increase information leak when introduced with
high dimensional data [7]. The same problem can occur when using k− same for large scale scenarios
involving the surveillance of millions of people. In addition to these works, researchers have looked at
complementary techniques such as developing privacy-friendly surveillance cameras [34, 35], but these
methods do not provide sufficient accuracy for privacy-preserving face recognition.
Fingerprint data and iris data are two other heavily used biometrics for identification and authen-
tication; privacy-preserving finger code authentication [36], and privacy-preserving key generation for
iris biometrics [37] are two approaches that apply cryptographic methods to maintain the privacy of
fingerprint and iris data. However, these solutions also need more efficient procedures, as crypto-
graphic approaches are inefficient in calculations. Privacy-preserving fingerprint and iris analysis can
be possible future applications for PEEP, but this needs further investigation. Classification is the
most commonly applied data mining technique that is used in biometric systems [38]. Encryption and
data perturbation are two main approaches also used for privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) [39].
Data perturbation often entails lower computational complexity than encryption at the expense of util-
ity. Hence, data perturbation is better at producing high efficiency in large scale data mining. Noise
addition, geometric transformation, randomization, condensation, and hybrid perturbation are a few
of the perturbation approaches [40, 7]. As data perturbation methods do not change the original
input data formats, they may concede some privacy leak [41]. A privacy model defines the constraints
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to the level of privacy of a particular perturbation mechanism [41]; k − anonymity, l − diversity,
(α, k) − anonymity, t − closeness and differential privacy (DP) are some of such privacy models [7].
DP is entrusted to provide a better level of privacy guarantee compared to previous privacy models
that are vulnerable to different privacy attacks [42, 43]. Laplace mechanism, Gaussian mechanism
[44], geometric mechanism, randomized response [45], and staircase mechanism [14] are a few of the
fundamental mechanisms used to achieve DP. There are many practical examples where these fun-
damental mechanisms have been used to build differentially private algorithms/methods. LDPMiner
[45], PINQ [46], RAPPOR [17], and Deep Learning with DP [12] are a few examples of such practical
applications of DP.
6. Conclusions
We proposed a novel mechanism named PEEP for privacy-preserving face recognition using data
perturbation. PEEP utilizes the properties of differential privacy, which can provide a strong level
of privacy to facial recognition technologies. PEEP does not need a trusted party and employs a
local approach where randomization is applied before the images reach an untrusted server. PEEP
forwards only randomized data, which requires no secure channel. PEEP is an efficient and lightweight
approach that can be easily integrated into any resource-constrained device. As the training and
testing/recognition of facial images done solely on the randomized data, PEEP does not incur any
efficiency loss during the recognition of a face. The differentially private notions allow users to tweak
the privacy parameters according to domain requirements. All things considered, PEEP is a state of
the art approach for privacy-preserving face recognition.
Using the proposed approach with different biometric algorithms and areas like fingerprint and iris
recognition will be looked at in the future, in particular with regards to effectiveness and sensitivity
in different domains of inputs.
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